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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In addition to the facts recited in Appellant Bennion's
Brief the following additional facts are pertinent in reply to
Respondent Gulf's Brief:
A.

Case History of the CS0-7024 litigation.

As noted in Appellant's previous recitation of facts, on
or about August 25, 1980, the drilling of the Albert Smith 2-8CS
Well, the second well drilled in the same drilling unit by Gulf,
was approved only by a staff petroleum engineer, not the Board of
Oil, Gas & Mining (hereinafter the "Board") as an infield test
well.

By letter, Mr. Bennion requested the Board to enjoin
drilling of the 2-8C5.

Because tbe Board would take no acti01

Bennion sought injunctive relief in Third District Court in
Bennion v. Gulf Oil Corporation, No. CS0-7024, pursuant to
Section 40-6-9(d) U.C.A.

(1953), as amended, to stop the dril

of the second well (R. 126).

Mr. Bennion asserted that thew

was being drilled unlawfully inasmuch as the Board didn't aut
ize its drilling and two wells could not be drilled in one un
After this case was filed and a hearing on plaintiff'

Mction for Preliminary Injunction, the proceedings in Civil N

C-80-7024 were continued on September 24, 1980 to allow the B
to hold an emergency hearing the next day to address the issu
whether or not drilling the second well should be stopped.
questions were certified by the Court to the Board.

N

(See

Reporter's Transcript of September 24, 1980, Hearing.)
As the hearing was held on September 25, 1980, and th
Board issued Emergency Order in Cause No. 139-20 (R. 154).

T

Order determined that (1) the drilling of the 2-8C5 as an inf
test well was lawful,

(2) drilling should not be enjoined, si

it was only a test well, and (3) the plaintiff was not requir
to pay any costs of the well at that time because it was a te
well.

The Board deten:1ined further that any designation of t

2-8C5 well as the unit production well would have to be done
pursuant to notice and hearing.

As of the time of his hearin
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however, the well was not authorized to replace the then producing unit production well.
Due to the action finally taken by the Board resulting in
the Order in Cause No. 139-20 from which Bennion could appeal the
parties entered into a stipulation for dismissal of Action No.
C-80-7024.

The Stipulation provided that:

An Order may be entered in this cause dismissing the

above-entitled action with prejudice and on the
merits upon the grounds that said action has been
rendered moot and the issues raised herein decided
by an emergency Order of the Board of Oil, Gas and
Mining dated October 3, 1980.
The Order was subsequently entered.
B.

The Record on Appeal includes the Rupp Affidavit

dated December 31, 1982.
In addition to the above, Gulf has raised a need for
further facts to be stated in regards to the record before the
lower Court.

Gulf has stated on pages 4-5 of its Brief that

documents, including the Orders in Cause Nos. 139-8, 139-20 and
139-20(B) and Production Reports for both the Albert Smith l-8C5
and 2-8C5 wells for the years 1980 through 1982 which were
attached to an Affidavit of Stephen W. Rupp dated December 31,
1982, were not before the lower court and were not filed with the
Court until March 3, 1983, the same day of the lower court's
Hemorandum Decision.

Therefore, Gulf argues these crucial

documents should not be considered by this Court.
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The fact is that Mr. Rupp' s Affidavit and attached
documents were presented to the lower court the day of the
hearing on January 4, 1983.

The documents were betore the lower

court during argument and were part of the case file for purposes
of the lower court's deliberation.

(See Judge Hanson's September

30, 1983, Order contained in Supplemental Record on Appeal).
Gulf's claim to the contrary is completely false and Judge
Hanson's Order, prompted as a direct result of Gulf's misstatement, clarifies conclusively the Record on Appeal.

(See

Reporter's Transcript of September 26, 1983, hearing in Supp.
Record.)
ARGUMENT
1.

WHETHER OR NOT ACTION NO. 80-7024 WAS RES JUDICATA IS NOT
AN ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT.
This case before this Court results from an appeal of the
administrative Order in Cause No. 139-20(B) from which Bennion
claims adverse effect due to the Board's designation of a second
well in Section 8 as a production well and the assessment of all
costs of the second well to owners.

The most substantial argu-

ment in Gulf's brief is that a dismissal of Civil Action No.
80-7024 pursuant to Stipulation of the parties is dispositive of
the issues raised in this case.

- 4 -

A.

The trial court, by implication, has already rejected

the res judicata argument and Gulf has failed to cross
appeal the ruling.
Although Gulf did not plead res judicata as an affirmative defense in its answer to plaintiff's Complaint, it extensively argued the point in its Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted to the lower court in support of its cross motion
for summary judgment (R. 56-59).

The lower court, however,

necessarily rejected Gulf's res judicata argument inasmuch as it
decided this case on the merits and granted Gulf's cross motion
for summary judgment based upon its interpretation of the law
pertinent to this case. The lower court's judgment plainly and
clearly expresses the grounds for its decision (R. 143-144,
238-239).

The court did not dismiss plaintiff's claim as being

res judicata.

Since a determination of the res judicata issue is

a threshold question prior to determining this case on the
merits, clear implication necessarily compels the conclusion that
the lower court decided against Gulf on the res judicata quest ion, or it never would have decided this case on the merits of
the parties respective motions.
Gulf's argument in its Brief concerning res judicata is
procedurally improper and inappropriate inasmuch as Gulf has
failed to perfect any appeal with this court claiming that the
lower court committed error in not dismissing plaintiff's complaint for res judicata.

It is respectfully submitted that this
- 5 -

court is now presented with res judicata arguments on questions
that are procedurally not properly before the court, and only
serve to unnecessarily obfuscate the legal issues involved in
deciding whether or not the lower court's ruling on the merits
was correct.
Gulf's arguments on res judicata, already rejected below,
are not issues legitimately before the court.

It is axiomatic

that issues not appealed cannot be issues for determination by
this Court.
B.

The C80-7024 litigation is not res judicata.

Assuming arguendo, that this Court determines res
judicata to be an issue properly before this Court, it is submitted in any event the CS0-7024 litigation is not res judicata.
Bennion's Complaint in Civil Action No. 80-7024 sought
injunctive relief from the drilling of the 2-BCS Well as an
infield test well.

The action was commenced for the reason that

the Board had refused to take action concerning the drilling of
this second well in Section 8 and the respective rights and
obligations of parties in interest.

The civil action was con-

tinued when an emergency hearing before the Board was provided.
It must be remembered that the civil action and the issues
addressed by the Board concerned the drilling of the 2-8CS Well
as an infield test well.

There had not yet been any application

or designation of the well for production.
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As a result of the emergency hearing, the Board issued
its Order in Cause No. 139-20 which approved the drilling of the
second well as a test well.

The Order further determined that

the plaintiff was not required to pay any costs of drilling the
2-8CS at that time because the well was a test well.
139-20, Paragraph III.)
all issues before it.

(See Order

At that point the Board had addressed
(See Paragraph 6, p. 3 of the same Order.)

Dismissal of Action No. 80-7024 was then proper since the
Board had taken action and the issues concerning the drilling and
costs of the 2-8CS as a test well had been addressed by the Board
by Order from which action might be taken pursuant to Section
40-6-10 U.C.A. (1953), as amended.
Once the Board had acted plaintiff's action for injunctive relief and the issues in that context no longer needed to be
decided since there was now a Board Order addressing the issues
from which action might be taken.

The issues raised in Action

No. 80-7024 need be viewed in the context of the Complaint for
injunctive relief.
Court.

That was the only remedy sought from the

Dismissal of the Complaint seeking injunctive relief has

no res judicata effect on an action in the nature of an appeal of
an administrative order taken the Board's Case No. 139-20(B)
Order.
The only issues raised and properly before the Court
concerned the injunction of the drilling of the 2-8CS as a test
well.

There was no issue of designation for production before
- 7 -

the Court or Board since no designation nor application for
designation had yet even occurred.
11.

CONTRARY TO GULF'S CONTENTION, THE BOARD HAD A MAtIDATE
NOT TO DESIGNATE THE 2-SCS WELL FOR PRODUCTION AND TO
ENSURE ECONOMICAL AND EFFICIENT PRODUCTION.
A.

There was no meaningful evidence taken by the Board

upon which to base its evaluation.
Gulf argues that the Board is mandated by law to designate the 2-SCS for production because of its duty to promote
recovery of oil and gas.

This argument completely ignores the

purpose, intent and protection afforded all interested parties by
law and previous Order of the Board of Oil and Gas.
Section 40-6-1, U.C.A.

(1953), as amended, reads in its

entirety as follows:
It is declared to be in the public interest to
foster, encourage and promote the development, production
and utilization of natural re.sources of oil and gas in
the State of Utah in such a manner as will prevent waste,
to authorize and provide for the operations and development of oil and gas properties in such a manner that a
greater ultimate recovery of all oil and gas may be
obtained and that the correlative rights of all owners be
fully protected; to encourage, authorize and provide for
voluntary agreements for cycling, recycling, pressure
maintenance and secondary recovery operations in order
that the reatest ossible economic recover of oil and
gas may be o taine. wit in t e State to t e end that the
landowners, the royalty owners, the producers and the
general public may realize and enjoy the greatest possible good from these vital resources.
(Emphasis added)

- 8 -

It is appellant's position that the foregoing statutory
provision and other pertinent language scattered throughout the
provisions of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act compel and require
any unit production well to operate in an efficient and economically prudent manner.

The Board must make a finding of what is

economically practical and prudent in order to avoid the kind of
circumstance that is before this Court in order that the "correlative rights of all owners be fully protected", and that waste is
not committed.
In the case at bar, as reflected in the production
records (R. 167-178), the production figures for oil recovered in
the last 12 months of operation of the two wells drilled in
Section 8 are as follows:
2-8CS Second Unit Well
(oetO'ber, 1981 - September, 1982)

l-8CS First Unit Well
(Marcn;-T9"80 - February, 1981)
10,230 total barrels
852 barrels average per month

7,687 total barrels
640 barrels average per month

The significance of the above computation is obvious.
The l-8CS well is not only a better producing well than the 2-8C5
well, but also, as of the time it was shut in, all of its cost
had been recouped.

The 2-8C5, which the Board authorized as the

unit well without any geologic or economic data in front of it,
cost in excess of $1,400,00.

The Board authorized it and shut-in

the l-8C5 well even though Gulf didn't even know it was going to
be a commercial well.

Gulf's only witness testified as follows:
- 9 -

MR. CHAIRMAN:
You don't even know if it is going to be a
co=ercial well '1
MR. ANTHONY:
No, we don't know that.
The only thing we
do know is that it was making approximately 60 barrels of
oil. We have no idea of what the extent of the reservoir
is. We can't know that at this time.
We realize that
this whole field is . . . apparently the reservoir due tbe
geologic structure of the thing - its almost impossible
to determine what's going to happen from one well to the
next as far as correlating said new production.
(R.
203-204)
The only relevant, though inadequate finding by the Board
in reference to the producing of the well was that the l-8CS was
at a "point of marginal recovery of further oil and/or gas."
(Order No. 139-20(B) at paragraph 6.)

There was a fatal lack of

any finding or evidence regarding economic justification for
shut-in of the l-8CS and production of the 2-8CS.
Thus, even though the 2-8C5 well is apparently less
productive than the l-8CS well and cost a tremendous amount of
money to drill, the Board shut in the well whose costs had been
totally recouped and authorized as the unit well a more expensive
unproductive well upon which there was no evidence that it was to
be a corrnnercial well.

Clearly, if the Board considered the

necessary relevant available data, it would have been in a better
position to evaluate the economic merit of designating 2-8C5 well
as the unit production well.

Section 40-6-6(d) required that

enough evidence be presented to justify a modification ot tbe
Unit Drilling Order.

This was not done, nor required, and the
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production of the second well should be found to be in violation
of the Act.
Furthermore, Gulf's interpretation of § 40-6-1, pertaining to what it considers the Board's mandate, would require that
the Board must approve every application to designate another
well for production.

This kind of reasoning defeats the purpose

of drilling units and would virtually never allow disapproval
since another well, even though it might only produce one barrel
of oil, and thus provide "greater ultimate recovery."
B. Gulf Should be Required to Account and Credit Bennion
For the Salvage Value of the l-8CS Well.
Gulf has argued further that Bennion should not be
credited with any salvage value of the l-8CS until the well is
plugged and abandoned.
tention.

Gulf offers no support for such a con-

The argument also fails to address the obvious conse-

quences and implications of such a ruling.
First, Gulf could repeatedly drill and equip wells at the
total cost of owners without even abandoning a previous well, the
cost of which it has fully recouped.

There is obviously no

incentive to abandon the well.
Second, if in fact the supposed sufficient justification
for production of the second well and shut-in of the first
existed, there would seem to be no question that the first should
be abandoned.

Gulf's argument would leave such a decision

completely to its own whim.
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Third, adopting defendants'

reasoning demonstrates the

necessity of seeking modification of the Unit Drilling Order.

In

the case of modification the owner is not subject to duplicative
cost since all the costs of each one well on each unit has been
justified.

In this case if modification had been sought and

approved, the owners would still be receiving their return on the
paid out l-8C5 and there would have been a finding that the
Drilling Unit Order should be modified so as to allow the 2-8C5
to be a producing well for another smaller unit.
the owners' rights would be protected.

In that case

In this case they are

not.
III<
THE BOARD'S PROCEDURE COMPLETELY DISREGARDS ITS
STATUTORY MANDATE TO PROTECT
RIGHTS.
ln response to point 3 of Gulf's Brief, appellant preliminarily submits that the comunitization agreement covering
Section 8 and the "accumulation of a huge amount of evidence
presented to the Board in numerous causes since the promulgation
of the order in Cause No. 139-8" are not part of the record on
appeal in this case.

For purposes of argument, however, appel-

lant concurs with respondent's claim that Section 8 is composed
of numerous mineral interest owners, some leased and some unleased.

Gulf's argument, if it is understood correctly, is that

the correlative rights of the working interest owners have not
been prejudiced as a result of the Board's procedure in
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authorizing the production of the No. 2 well and concomitant
imposition of its cost upon the interest owners.

Gulf's argument

completely ignores the facts of this case inasmuch as Mr. Bennion
and the other interest owners in the unit have been deprived of
the right to receive the oil and gas production from the No. 1
well without any concomitant costs, in exchange for what apparently is production from a less productive well which will take
many years to pay out in order that the interest owners receive
the production free of costs.
Hr. Bennion, of course, is now being deprived of his full
share of production inasmuch as Gulf now has the right to deprive
him of seven-eights of his share of production to pay for his
proportionate share of the costs of the No. 2 well.

Mr. Bennion,

through his proportionate share of production, pays his proportionate share of the costs of the second well in its entirety.
Gulf's claim that he has not risked a penny is beside the point
because that claim does not provide justification for unreasonably and imprudently depriving Mr. Bennion and all of the
other interest owners in the unit from the production of a more
productive paid out well.

Such a claim also completely fails to

recognize the fact that the position Mr. Bennion finds himself in
vis-a-vis Gulf is statutorily defined in Sec. 40-6-6-(g) (h) of
the Oil and Gas Conservation Act .

If respondent believes Mr.

Bennion's position is so untenable, its argument is with the Utah
Legislature, not with Mr. Bennion.
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CONCLUSION
To a great extent Gulf's arguments demonstrate the
impropriety of the Board's Order designating the 2-8CS for
production.

Gulf recognizes at page 16 of its Brief the huge

amount of evidence confirming the wisdom of 640-acre spacing
units and at page 4, in quoting their own expert,
evidence to change such spacing.

the lack of

Gulf, however, fails to recog-

nize the additional concern in the establishment of that size of
unit that the recovery from the unit would justify the expense of
drilling one well.

Obviously had the potential recovery justi-

fied the costs of drilling two wells, the units would have been
so spaced.

Now Gulf argues that even though the potential

recovery does not justify the modification of the spacing unit
another well should be designated for production anyway since it
made the irreversible error of unilaterally seeking approval and
drilling a less than marginally productive test well.
The lower Court should be required to enter summary
judgment for Bennion requiring the Board to shut in the second
well, determine its production and the assessment of its costs to
be error, and to reinstate the operation of the first well.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

of October, 1983.

McKAY,

and
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